The Question of Abortion
The Question of Abortion in a Free Society
Murry N. Rothbard’s argument in favor of legal abortion in a free society challenged me and bumped against my strong religious foundation. I believe in property rights, of which self-ownership is key, but acquiescing to such a posture left me uncomfortable and unsettled. How can one reconcile one’s belief in the protection of the unborn child’s life, while maintaining a woman’s freewill over her own body? The focus seems to be on the woman’s rights once the child is conceived and the child’s “right” to reside in her body unwanted, yet the causal action that the situation in question could not exist without is frequently disregarded. Many can agree on abortion being a property rights and self-ownership issue, but the remonstration persists over where the property line should be drawn. Is it possible that such rights have been misappropriated in the circumstances surrounding this debate? Potentially, there is a contractual perspective that may have been overlooked.
Consider Murray N. Rothbard’s position in, For a New Liberty (page 139).
“Most discussion of the issue bogs down in minutiae about when human life begins, when or if the fetus can be considered to be alive, etc. All this is really irrelevant to the issue of the legality (again, not necessarily the morality) of abortion. The Catholic antiabortionist, for example, declares that all that he wants for the fetus is the rights of any human being—i.e., the right not to be murdered. But there is more involved here, and this is the crucial consideration. If we are to treat the fetus as having the same rights as humans, then let us ask: What human has the right to remain, unbidden, as an unwanted parasite within some other human being’s body? This is the nub of the issue: the absolute right of every person and hence every woman, to the ownership of her own body. What the mother is doing in an abortion is causing an unwanted entity within her body to be ejected from it: If the fetus dies, this does not rebut the point that no being has a right to live, unbidden, as a parasite within or upon some person’s body.
The common retort that the mother either originally wanted or at least was responsible for placing the fetus within her body is, again, beside the point. Even in the stronger case where the mother originally wanted the child, the mother, as the property owner in her own body, has the right to change her mind and to eject it.”
It appears Rothbard’s premise likens the fetus to a parasitic, subsisting off of the woman’s body absent her permission and desire. However, this claim is not self-evident when considering the following definition of the word “parasite”.
According to https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parasite?src=search-dict-hed
1. an organism living in, on, or with another organism in order to obtain nutrients, grow, or multiply often in a state that directly or indirectly harms the host
- NOTE: Some restrict the use of parasite to include only multicellular forms (such as protozoans and helminths) while others use it to include bacteria and viruses.
2. someone or something that resembles a biological parasite in living off of, being dependent on, or exploiting another while giving little or nothing in return
Can such a definition accurately be applied to a human in the earliest stages of development? Only in the most isolated cases can a baby be considered harmful to the mother—uncomfortable, yes, but harmful world be a stretch, no pun intended. Even if one acknowledges the obvious dependency of the fetus on the would-be mother, logical conclusions must contemplate where this definition would end when applied to such a circumstance. Does a baby become independent at birth? From birth to toddler or from childhood to adolescence? When is the parasitic nature of the individual no longer applicable? Yes, it may change or even lessen in degree as the individual grows, but where would a free society draw the line as to the mother’s legal justification in simply changing her mind concerning the responsibility of her child? Is birth the cutoff? If so, why? Simply because the developing human no longer resides in her body? Does not “her body” play a significant role in caring for that child beyond birth? These are serious questions. Whether a baby is inside the body or outside the dependency factor remains, either with an ambilocal cord or breast, that baby persist in its reliance upon the mother for its most basic needs. A reliance that continues for a significant period beyond a mother’s womb, therefore, the above definition of a parasite extends far beyond the matrix. For this reason, clarity must be achieved and the rationale behind such a distinction must not exist as a mere arbitrary conclusion.
This is by no means an effort to negate the liberty of the woman, however, honest conversations must be had regarding this matter. Rothbard also contended that contracts would not be legally binding until property was exchanged: i.e., money, land, etc. If a contract and/or agreement remained only in its verbal or written stage without any active transaction(s) taking place, either party could legitimately withdraw from that arrangement free and clear, i.e., change their mind. Conversely, if a transaction of property occurs then the specified parties are obliged to fulfill their contractual stipulations. And here is where the argument pertaining to abortion should abide.
A fatal flaw in the debate is the frequent assumption that pregnancy is the beginning of the story. This is evident in Rothbard’s use of the word, unbidden, which is defined as: not ordered or commanded; spontaneous; not asked or summoned; uninvited. According to dictionary.com. This sparks two points. The first surrounds the unwanted spontaneity of pregnancy. One can concede the undesired state of being with child, but to forgo the cause and affect nature of the predicament leaves the equation incomplete for pregnancy is a consequence of a prior arrangement between two free acting individuals. Sex is just that, a freewill exchange of property—one’s body—i.e., self-ownership. The problem with our societal approach to this exchange is that people act like there are no consequences, trade-offs, or effects associated with it. It is mere pleasure, but the current discussion proves otherwise. Multiple effects result from sexual activity such as emotional, psychological, the potential for disease, infection, and the most obvious, pregnancy. Pregnancy is the most obvious consequence of a sexual exchange between a man and a woman, yet it is handled like some sort of anomaly or malfunction. Each of us substantiate the commonality with nature. A natural contract that would qualify pregnancy to be handled as an outcome consistent with a transaction between two persons, not as the initial condition.
Let it also be acknowledged that this exchange, though common, remains unique given the newness of life that emerges from it. This is why a holistic approach is requisite in determining the validity in that life’s continuance or termination. With this comes the second point of emphasis regarding the unbidden state of the fetus/baby, the uninvited perspective. The first question one must ask is, “When did the baby to-be elect or choose to be in the woman’s body?” The baby was given no choice in the matter, just as all of us had no choice in who our mother was and the situations we were birthed into. Therefore, to liken the baby to a trespasser is simply incorrect. The child is specifically there because of the woman’s actions.
Suppose a man bets a sum of money on a game with another man, then loses that sum at a multiple far greater than he is able to pay. Is his newfound debt not ordered or commanded; not asked or summoned; uninvited? Because of its undesirability, would that man then be justified in not paying off that debt? What if he could not afford the debt? Even though his predicament is unfortunate, his action created his quandary. He obviously did not want that outcome, but to say it is uninvited would be fallacious and one sided. That outcome was a distinct possibility and a risk he was willing to take. This is the same path actors in copulation travel. It is a mutual arrangement where both parties thought they would be better off. Of course, in gabbling only one party typically comes away the beneficiary, nevertheless, that does nothing to refute their voluntary participation. It is simply a case of erroneous speculation on the part of the losing actor. Each person gambles that the most obvious outcome will not be an outcome at all—assuming the risk. In understanding what parenthood is, for those who don’t wish to be parents, these actors gamble their own lives at the risk of creating a new life. If the most obvious outcome is the outcome, the two actors are now indebted to the life they have mutually produced. They sought only the positive payout just as the gambling man, but instead received something far different from what they had hoped. Shall they be absolved of their debt? That is a question only for the creditor. I’ll let the reader contemplate who that might be.
Accumulating mounds of debt only to demand its cancellation on the grounds of one’s unwillingness to pay it off is theft. Borrowing money with no intention to pay it back. Rothbard argued against such practices in Man, Economy and State. Whether likened to fractional reserve banking or legal bankruptcy, so should a woman not be able to absolve herself of her own debt.
Would it then be absurd to categorize abortion as a form market manipulation? As bold as that may be, is this not human action? Is it not economics: the allocation of scarce resources that have alternative uses? Sex is a scarce resource with alternative uses; pleasure, reproduction, both. Even with pleasure being the most prevalent of intents, reproduction is always present and must be acknowledged. Thus, actors have multiple options in taking preventative measures in thwarting conception. But once conception occurs, debt accrues. Given reproduction’s tenacity, procreation is an ever-present danger to those seeking only pleasure, speculation with a hope of profit and a threat of loss is also ever-present—an assumed risk, a gamble. If their speculation, like the entrepreneur’s, turns out to be specious then they bare the loss, but if it turns out to be correct, then they enjoy the profits. It seems an argument can be made that the market for sex would potentially be different if actors were expected to bear the weight of their speculation just as entrepreneurs are.
Though it is true that humans have participated in sexual activity throughout history, some exploits more notable than other, can one genuinely ignore the shift in sex culture in the last half century and the impact it has had on divorce rates, illegitimacy, the family, and more? Sex means something. Our approach and culture regarding sex means something. Therefore, abortion and our outlook on it means something. I can also concede that one’s treatment of sex is predicated largely on culture. Nevertheless, as it pertains to property rights, sex is a transaction, an exchange of one’s self with another and should be approached from the standpoint of contract enforcement. If a child results, those who participated in that exchange, both man and woman, should legally be expected uphold that natural contract and pay their newfound debt, exchanging their life for the new life.
